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Samuel Beckett’s writing is not one that builds up toward some 
dramatic climax - the first paragraph of Company says it all: “A voice 
comes to one in the dark. Imagine.’’(5)1 There is, however, a dose of 
formal dexterity in these two simple sentences, because what they de­
scribe seems to be anterior to the very act of description: the scene of 
writing itself. They also present us with some problems concerning 
the identities involved in the text. Apparently, there is the voice, 
therefore the speaker; also “one on his back in the dark,” that is to 
say, the hearer. These are the patent presences but, since they are ob­
viously narrated, there is the third identity, the narrator, whose nar­
ration is directed towards yet another presence, some addressee - 
hence the injunction: “Imagine.” These nine words already seem to 
bring to life quite a company. The next paragraph develops the scene:
That then is the proposition. To one on his back in the dark a voice 
tells of a past. With occasional allusions to a present and more 
rarely to a future as for example, You will end as you now are. And 
in another dark or in the same another devising it all for company.
5-6
The last sentence introduces some confusion into the quartet we 
seemed to have detected as well as into the original scene. Above all, 
there is yet another identity here - the deviser, “another devising it
1 My quotations come from the collected edition: S. Beckett: Nohow On: 
Company, III Seen III Said, Worstward Ho. London: John Calder, 1989.
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all for company,” - but who is he? The author? The narrator? Or yet an­
other presence whose imagination brings everything to life? What is more, 
the stage gets multiplied: apart from the original scene in the dark, there 
might be yet another dark, which would be the place where the deviser 
abides. As we can see, the matters get more and more complicated, so in or­
der not to widen the domain of confusion, it would be advisable to stick to 
the rudimentary question: who is talking to whom and about whom? Bear­
ing this in mind, we can delve into the narrative in order to find more clues. 
But what we find is not very promising - neither the sender nor the ad­
dressee can be definitively ascertained:
If the voice is not speaking to him [the hearer] it must be speaking to an­
other. So with what reason remains he reasons. To another of that other. 
Or of him. Or of another still. To another of that other or of him or of an­
other still. To one on his back in the dark in any case. Of one on his back in 
the dark whether the same or another.
8-9
And, further on, we find similar uncertainty about the speaker:
For why or? Why in another dark or in the same? And whose voice asking 
this? Who asks, Whose voice asking this? And answers, His soever who de­
vises it all. In the same dark as his creature or in another. For company. 
Who asks in the end, Who asks? And in the end answers as above? And 
adds long after to himself, Unless another still.
19
Although there seems to be nothing strange in the multiplicatory power of 
imagination - imaginary objects can be multiplied ad infinitum - this 
process has always traditionally been conceived as working only one way: 
the imagined can divide itself without end, but the source of the imaginings, 
the subject, in order to multiply itself in the imaginary act, has to remain 
one and stable. In spite of that, the above fragment opens the production 
from the “subjective” end, too. If it is possible to ask “Who asks, Whose 
voice asking this?” and then “Who asks in the end, Who asks?” Then noth­
ing can stop the narrator from pursuing in this vein: “Who asks, Who asks, 
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Who asks?” and so on.2 What happens then is that the site of imagination or 
discourse gets emptied by such an operation and the deviser recedes into in­
finity.
But all the self-reflexive gestures in the text, the gestures that try to lo­
cate the source and the destination of the voice, take place outside the voice 
proper. Addressing the unspecified “you,” the voice itself speaks of “a past” 
and large parts of the narration are devoted to “tableaux” evoked by re­
membrance - memories of a birth, childhood, adolescence, maturity that 
are interspersed with the self-reflexive parts of Company. Such a situation, 
however, brings new questions to the surface: whose past is that and for 
what reason does the voice relate it? The second of these seems to be the 
easier one to answer, since some pages into the “story” we find such a char­
acteristic of the voice:
Another trait its repetitiousness. Repeatedly with only minor variants the 
same bygone. As if willing him by this dint to make it his. To confess, Yes 
I remember. Perhaps even to have a voice. To murmur, Yes I remember. 
What an addition to company that would be! A voice in the first person sin­
gular. Murmuring now and then, Yes I remember.
12-13
The voice is, apparently, trying to force the hearer into acknowledging that 
the related memories are his (the hearer’s). It all comes down to the mean­
ing of the pronoun “I,” or, rather, since “I” is a shifter,3 to the matter of its
2 L. Bersani, U. Dutoit: Arts of Impoverishment: Beckett, Rothko, Resnais. Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 68.
3 Roman Jakobson’s term, whose work on pronouns was developed in the late 1950s by 
Emile Benveniste. According to him, personal pronouns differ in a very substantial way from 
words designating objects such as a tree, because “tree” always refers to the same signified, 
the same concept no matter who utters the word. It is not the case with “I” or “you”; the pro­
noun “I” refers at the same time to any individual whatsoever and a particular individual who 
utters it. The shifters become identified only temporarily in the act of discourse: “/refers 
to the act of individual discourse in which it is pronounced, and by this it designates the 
speaker [...]. It is in the instance of discourse in which / designates the speaker that the 
speaker proclaims himself as the ‘subject.’ And so it is literally true that the basis of subjec­
tivity is in the exercise of language. If one really thinks about it, one will see that there is re­
ally no other objective testimony to the identity of the subject except that which he himself 
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distribution, to an identity or identities the pronoun relates to. Such knowl­
edge would, moreover, pave our way to putting into focus the deviser of 
what the narrative, in a few places, calls a “fable” (51 and passim}. The al­
ready quoted fragment continues:
Who asks in the end, Who asks? And in the end answers as above? And 
adds long after to himself, Unless another still. Nowhere to be found. No­
where to be sought. The unthinkable last of all. Unnamable. Last person. I.
19
The one who “devices it all,” the one who always comes last - because it is 
the vanishing point of the infinitely receding succession of devisers - is the 
consolidated figure of the I-subject. Such placing of the originator of the 
“fable” may also allow us to understand better the positions of other “iden­
tities” within the narrative. At the very beginning of the text the “actors” 
are located with respect to each other:
Use of the second person marks the voice [of the speaker]. That of the 
third that cankerous other [of the narrator]. Could he speak to and of 
whom the voice speaks [the hearer] there would be a first. But he cannot. 
He shall not. You cannot. You shall not.
6
The situation would seem easy to grasp if it was not for one “presence.” We 
would be able to represent the scene as one in which the originally split de­
viser of the voice and of the voice’s hearer tries also to devise himself as 
a whole, a self-present entity. This deviser in order to devise himself as pres­
ent would have to devise the voice and the hearer as the two that could iden­
tify each other as one and the same. Such identification would enable the re­
verse movement, that is, the production of the deviser as one, to start. But 
this neat structure is ruined by the existence of yet another “actor” on the 
memory scene - the presence of the narrative voice breaks the feeble equi­
librium of the self-identifying subject. And this is precisely its function: in 
thus gives about himself.” (E. Benveniste: Problems in General Linguistics. Trans.
M.E. Meek. Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1971, p. 226).
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Beckett’s text, such an identification is impossible and this very impossibil­
ity, which is not a stable concept but just a (lack of) movement of identifica­
tion, in order to be presented at all, is represented in the figure of the nar­
rating voice which is the very movement of representation back to the 
deviser but which is stalled since it cannot speak to and of the hearer as the 
“you”-voice can. The reason why the communication between the narrator 
and the hearer is impossible remains to be discovered.4
Apart from being essentially staged, the voice that speaks to one in the 
dark has multiple other characteristics: it is flat, it is faint, it unexpectedly 
changes places, etc.; but, apart from everything else, it also seems to pos­
sess a quality that places the whole manifestly aural scene in question:
From ranging far and wide as if in quest the voice comes to rest and con­
stant faintness. To rest where? Imagine warily.
Above the upturned face. Falling tangent to the crown. So that in the faint 
light it sheds were there a mouth to be seen he would not see it. Roll as he 
might his eyes.
38; italics mine
The voice sheds the light that the hearer is able to see - the hearer sees (or, 
at least, might see) the voice as it speaks in the dark. What we can observe 
here seems strangely familiar and the familiarity is of a very old date. 
Actually, this kind of scene may take us back almost as far as it is possible to 
4 Jacques Lacan explains the origin of the subject in similar ways. The illusory dyadic 
identification with the other as one’s mirror image (méconnaissance/misprision) is only po­
ssible in the realm of the Imaginary (images, figures, the same) before the ego is formed. 
Whenever a speech act happens (the “no” of the father) a signifier appears, which opens the 
Symbolic and splits the wholeness of the image in the mirror, introducing the decentred sub­
ject (“sentenced” to desire) of triadic interaction. This way, the subject is produced by the in­
corporation of the other (the father - the figure that prevents the movement of 
identification) within itself. (J. L a c a n: “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of 
the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience.” In: Ecrits. Trans. A. Sheridan. Lon­
don: Routledge, 1977).
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travel - to one of the founding scenes of the western civilisation, a veritable 
origin of sorts.
In Plato’s metaphysics the sensible world, as mutable, cannot be consid­
ered real and, therefore, much cannot be gained, in terms of knowledge, by 
the direct practice of the senses. There is, however, one agency that is able 
to provide us with knowledge that is certain and which does not originate 
from the sensual reality. This infallible source of wisdom is everyone’s soul 
which is without a beginning and immortal. A quality of being eternal is 
precisely the source of the soul’s claims to knowledge because everything 
that really exists, by the very definition, has to be changeless and eternal 
and cannot be perceived by our senses. In our perception we only get the 
semblance of the real reflected in the imperfect world of mutable matter. 
The reality or what actually exists is the world of Ideas of which the highest 
is the Idea of Good. The Ideas are colourless and shapeless, imperceptible 
for the eye of flesh, but visible to the soul by means of the mind.5 The soul 
that collapses into the mortal body forgets what it has seen, but this knowl­
edge never gets erased completely. There is always a certain inner voice 
present at our disposal which is the voice of the soul’s memory, and it is this 
voice that is able to take us back to the scene on which the Ideas are pre­
sented. The voice, if we listen to it in an appropriate manner (and such lis­
tening is called anamnesis by Socrates6) can take us back to what our soul 
has already seen - the Ideas which present themselves as eidos (from eido\ 
to see). It is sight, therefore, that is the domain of absolute knowledge and 
the intricate scene of hearing is posited only to be converted, through the 
synesthetic detour, into the scene of a seeing: the scene of listening and the 
scene of seeing are simply identical - “There is of course the eye,” says the 
narrator of Company, “[flilling the whole field.” (16)
In Company, darkness as well as voice belong to the same order, the or­
der of the seen. This darkness is clearly visible and gradable:
5 Plato: Phaedrus, 247 C.
6 Plato: Meno, 81 D.
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The temptation is strong to decree that there is nothing to see. But too late 
for the moment. For he sees a change of dark when he opens or shuts his 
eyes.
41
Is, then, the scopic inevitable? And if so, what is the reason? The answers to 
these questions seem to lie in the very staging of the scene of knowledge: 
the scene of listening cannot by-pass the scene of seeing for the very simple 
reason that the most important element of the former - the voice - is al­
ready a figure and as figure it is accessible only in a seeing.
The voice by re-presenting the idea in the sensible, that is to say, by be­
ing the figure of the idea leads one to the presentation proper of the idea as 
imageless, immutable and present. This presence is presented in an 
(in)sight that permits access without help of the senses, that is to say, the in­
sight is enabled in all its ideality by what we can call, after Immanuel Kant, 
the “forming force” of reason or transcendental imagination,7 which are 
categories “empty” of any content, categories as that which allow us to per­
ceive an entity as a separate entity and not as just an aggregate of its sensi­
ble qualities. Yet such a presentation called “presence” is already a figure 
produced by reason because these categories, that is, what allows reason 
to perceive something as present, the means by which reason installs its ob­
ject as present to reason, are necessarily the product of reason. In such 
a way, reason installs itself and becomes its own producer: there is a double 
mirror within reason in which reason reflects itself as reflection. Ultimately, 
and paradoxically, it is the mirror that produces everything including the 
mirror itself. Therefore, what is intelligible and present because seen as 
eidos is already a figure, that is to say, fiction - and, accordingly, the scene 
of listening/seeing, in both Phaedrus and Company, is the one that has 
been or has to be “imagine[dj warily.” (38)
7 P. Lacoue-Labarthe: Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics. Ed. 
Ch. Fynsk. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989, p. 70. This article is 
greatly indebted to the work done on mimesis by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy. Although the relevant material will appear in the notes, I must stress my debt to their 
work in general - the moments of specific influence are too numerous to be specified every 
time.
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As we have already noticed, the region of seeing is also the domain of 
knowledge: what is seen is the (re)presentation of the essence, which is pure 
knowledge itself. In this sense, representation does not only belong to the 
field of the optical but to the theorised as well; or, rather, the optical is at 
the same time always already the domain where theorising is taking place - 
any figure has its source in the figure of reason. The point of this propo­
sition can be clearly grasped in the double meaning of the above genitive: 
reason produces figures (e.g. categories) but, in producing the figures, it, by 
producing them, also produces itself; in such a two-way process reason, to 
be itself, cannot only be reasoning, it also has to reason (or produce) itself as 
reasoning. And this concept of reason as theorising in figures, that is to say, 
bestowing meaning, or as the presence present to itself in its presence is ob­
viously also the figure of the Cartesian human subject who thinks and knows 
himself thinking. Therefore, taking this homology into consideration, we 
can be justified to say that every figure as such is ultimately the figure of 
humanity - and in this sense, but only in this sense, man is the only figure 
that is the source of meaning. Such a situation, at least, takes place in a his­
tory of philosophy that valorises the pre-expressive, pre-representational 
presence, that is to say, the whole history of western thinking from Plato to 
Edmund Husserl, and maybe beyond...
Yet, this original scene of philosophy may also be regarded in a different 
and more sinister light. If we read further into Phaedrus we find out that it 
is also the scene where the dead come to speak - the voice or voices that 
one hears in the dark are also the voices of one’s previous incarnations. 
Therefore, it is the dead that lead one to the figure (as the idea) and who 
present themselves as figure (the immutable knowledge). We come here to 
the unexpected and portentous juncture - could it be that the figure of rea­
son is the figure of dead humanity or the subject as dead?
As we have already mentioned, the scene of Company is the scene of an 
agon, the struggle in which the existent-subject devices the voice which 
tries to force the hearer (the non-reflexive “level” of the subject that cannot 
be turned into figure) to acknowledge the past the voice relates as the past 
of the hearer. The voice, by presenting the past as figures, cannot help theo­
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rising (that is, fabricating) it. The hearer listens to/sees these figures but is 
not able to recognise them as representing himself. And the very process of 
non-recognition, of being unable to see the theorising that is taking 
place, is presented as the narratorial voice - the narrator is the very obsta­
cle on the way to engendering of the subject by the subject itself. Because 
the narrator cannot speak to and of the hearer at the same time, because the 
speaking self and the self that is spoken8 struggle to oust the opponent from 
its place, the subject is not permitted to freeze itself in the narcissistic 
self-speculation - if it was not for the fight that is figured in the obstacle of 
the narrator, the subject would represent itself to itself and, by doing this, 
become fictional, stable, dead.
This is precisely what happens on the scene of autobiography and this is 
also why such kind of writing, in spite of all its claims, cannot avoid being 
fictional. The narrator suggests that: “You lie in the dark with closed eyes 
and see the scene. As you could not at the time.” (30-31) In order to evoke 
the scene as a scene of memory, that is, as stable and present one has to 
make oneself absent from it, one has to put oneself out. Therefore, remem­
bering oneself is actually imagining oneself as other who is present within 
the scene, also imagined as having taken place for this other. Remembering 
is, then, devising oneself as other and, necessarily, also as the other remem­
bering this other. Here again, we come across the infinite regression.
Deviser of the voice and of its hearer and of himself. Deviser of himself for 
company. Leave it at that. He speaks of himself as of another. He says 
speaking of himself, He speaks of himself as of another, [and: He speaks, 
He speaks, He speaks of himself as of another, etc.]
20
But the other of memory is not only fictional but also, as the figure which is 
intelligible, that is, immutable and whole, he is not a living other. The sub­
ject that is present to itself, the subject that knows and means, is nothing 
other than the voice from beyond the grave. In this sense, autobiography, as 
the narrative in the first person, is strictly speaking impossible to be writ­
8 D. We sling, T. Sławek: Literary Voice: The Calling of Jonah. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 12-13.
8 - Zobaczyć świat...
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ten, and what passes for it takes in all its actuality the form of an agony9 - 
a tortuous and hopeless struggle between the author and the dead to the 
death of the former, when (after the body is buried) he remains in the world 
only as a figment, image: stabilised, theorised, himself dead.10
But, how is the self other than figure, other than death itself, possible? 
Or, rather, - since this is precisely what Beckett shows - how is the self as 
figure impossible? And what is the meaning of such an impossibility? In or­
der to elucidate these matters, we have to go back again to the problem of 
“presence” - a founding concept of our originary scene.
As we have already noticed, presence is a double “phenomenon” - it is 
at once the presence of the object of consciousness to consciousness (rea­
son, self, mind’s eye - whatever we call it), and the presence of conscious­
ness to itself. The present object of consciousness is necessarily ideal, since, 
in order to appear in consciousness (in order to present itself), it has to be 
rid of all empirical diversity - it has to be identical with itself as the same. 
And it is precisely the very ideality of such an object that makes possible its 
being infinitely repeated as re-presented as the image of the immutable 
same. If this is the case, then we can say that the sensible re-presentation is 
the return of the pre-expressive presentation of the ideal object of con­
sciousness. But there is a flaw in this understanding of representation (al­
though such an understanding is the history of metaphysics) - the very pos­
9 Ibidem, p. 179.
10 The above mentioned book by Donald Wesling and Tadeusz Sławek very often moves 
along similar (though not exactly) routes. Especially interesting in the light of my analysis of 
biographical subject is the fact that they discuss the Celanian subject as “belittled by memo­
ries which do not perform an act of determining one’s location” and that bring up “a place 
which immediately begins to shrink, thus changing into an opening, a chasm.” (57) The au­
thors of Literary Voice also discuss the production of the subject (not only autobiographical) 
as an agon: “The speaking subject is an in-process, dialogic relationship between whoever 
speaks and whoever is spoken, theorized in full consciousness that there will be baffles, mul­
tiplications of imaginary selves and voices, diacritical distances, slippages of meaning, pro­
blems with pronouns. These troubles arise because each of the fraternal internal antagonists, 
the speaking and the spoken, wishes to interfere with, silence, and finally kill off the other, 
even as both must know that the continuous mutual interference is what creates the effect of 
literature.” (13) What is more, the quotation to which this fragment refers is the extract from 
Beckett’s Texts for Nothing.
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sibility of the return of presentation as re-presentation is what makes 
presentation as such impossible: re-presentation would not be possible, if 
presentation would not already allow its own absence. That is to say, the 
repetition of the same of presentation would be out of the question, if this 
same were not originally other than itself.11 The above would therefore 
bring us to the conclusion that it is not the same which is the matrix for rep­
etition or re-presentation, but that it is precisely repetition or the split ori­
gin of the same that produces the same - that, originally, the same is always 
other to itself. What is more, this primal differing from itself is obviously 
also the point where the originary deferring11 2 takes place, as the identity of 
the object is always deferred in the chain of representations the object is. 
(The object is always already a representation, a repetition which can lead 
only to another repetition.) Therefore, the originary repetition is also the 
site where time and space originate, but not as presence - if time meant 
just presence, if the source of time were not already split, if time did not 
originally defer itself, if it were identical with itself, time would already be 
still-born at its very source, or, in other words, there would be neither time 
nor space since there could not be any difference between the points of time 
or space.
Thus, as we have said, the origin of consciousness is split, is always al­
ready repeated. In terms of our discussion, this means that, since it is always 
at once present and absent, it can never be stabilised enough to be seen (as 
either present or absent) and, therefore, it can never be made into a figure. 
Moreover, for the very reason that the split is anterior to consciousness, or, 
rather, that it is what produces consciousness, it is irrecoverable for con­
sciousness - the subject cannot see (theorise, figure) its own conception. 
And here we have come to the point that might provide us with an explana­
tion why the process of self-constitution by the subject in Company is im­
possible to be accomplished: the subject cannot be present to itself because 
it cannot theorise its own conception and engender itself in seeing itself do 
11 Th. Trezise: Into the Breach: Samuel Beckett and the Ends of Literature. Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 19-20.
12 J. Derrida: “Differance.” In: Margins of Philosophy. Trans. A. Bass. London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982.
8*
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so.13 All attempts at self-production as presence have to fail because the 
subject cannot act as its own author/father, and all experiments to become 
one have to end up in bringing up a figure of the author-deviser who, as 
a figure, has to be devised by yet another deviser who also becomes a figure 
and so on ad infinitum. Beckett’s innovation here is not that he splits the 
consciousness into separate “identities” (this has been done often enough), 
but that he uses figures in ways that go entirely against the grain of tradition 
- the figures are there to provide company (they are the figures of human­
ity, after all, but, as the figures of humanity, they are also the figures of the 
same and, therefore, not very companionable), but the function of, at least, 
some of them is not to elucidate, to provide knowledge, but to confuse and 
obstruct - “Confusion too is company up to a point,” says the narratorial 
voice (20). This makes of the narrative voice especially a particularly ambig­
uous junction - on the one hand, his figure is there to sabotage any possibil­
ity of neat categorisations within the narrative, but, on the other, the narra­
tor is, at the same time, also the very figure of such confusion and 
obstruction. It makes for a very strange literary feat indeed - the veritable 
figure of the stranger. But this stranger is not just an other - since it is not 
the figure of knowledge, it is not the figure of the same and, therefore, also 
not the figure of humanity and its reason. What we have come to touch 
upon in this place seems to be lying outside the domain of man and within 
the realm of the monstrous. It seems that, in the stranger, we have encoun­
tered the figure of the properly inhuman, and - since, in spite of all, it ac­
tually is a figure - also that which we could, hesitatingly, call a sense of the 
inhuman, or the inhuman as sense, using the word “sense” here in an ap­
propriately monstrous way, that is to say, stretching its signification be­
tween English and French, as meaning at least all of these: the sensible, the 
intelligible and direction.
13 Ph. Lac ou e-Lab ar th e: Typography..., p. 127.
